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modern	 humanity.	 He	 therefore	 repeatedly	




love. This idea has almost vanished from the 
modern	 Christian	 theological	 tradition,	 and	
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More	 often	 than	 not,	 the	 natural	 world	 can	
be	 quite	 perplexing.	 Even	 the	 things	we	 to-
day	take	for	self-evident,	need	not	have	been	
such	 for	our	 ancestors.	Try	 to	 remember	 the	
disbelief	you	felt	when	you	first	 encountered	
the	 fact	 that	 all	 bodies	 fall	 at	 the	 same	 rate,	
regardless	 of	 their	mass.	 Surely,	 that	 cannot	
be	so,	a	young	mind	thinks,	an	anvil	is	bound	










had	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 powers	 and	 discipline	 of	
their	minds,	 because	 the	 physical	world	 and	
the	senses	can	be	treacherous	and	deceptive.	
A	 long	 time	 ago,	 the	 best	way	 to	 become	 a 
physicist (so  to  speak) was	 to	 read	a	book	‒	
Aristotle’s Physics.
It	took	quite	some	time	for	us	to	become	com-





the	 past	 to	 provide	 us	 with	 answers	 to	 our	





This  is  the  language that  is  spoken of  in  the  
book The Language of Nature: Reassessing 
the Mathematization of Natural Philosophy 
in the Seventeenth Century.	The	book	is	com-
prised	of	 twelve	distinct	 essays	 collected	by	
editors	 Geoffrey	 Gorham,	 Benjamin	 Hill,	
Edward	Slowik	and	C.	Kenneth	Waters,	 and	
published	 in	 2016	 by	 University	 of	 Minne-
sota	Press	 as	 a	part	 of	Minnesota	Studies	 in	
the	 Philosophy	 of	 Science	 series.	 Contribu-
tors  of  this  book  are  professors  of  various  
universities	 and	 colleges	 from	 the	 United	




rallied	 around	 a	 common	 topic,	 namely,	 the	
so-called mathematization thesis, an idea that 
the ever-greater	use	of	mathematics	as	a	con-
stitutive	 element	 of	 natural	 philosophy	 dur-
ing	 the	 seventeenth-century	played	 a	pivotal	
role	in	the	emergence	of	modern	science.	The	
soundness of this idea is probed from various 
standpoints:	 some	 essays	 are	 engaging	 with	
historical	figures	such	as	Galileo	and	Leibniz,	
while	others	focus	on	the	development	of	im-
portant	 ideas	 like	 laws	of	motion.	All	of	 the	
texts	 are	 seriously	 researched	 and	 equipped	
with	sizeable	lists	of	references,	yet	topically	
distinct	enough	to	avoid	repetition	and	to	offer	








a	 prominent	 historical	 milestone.	 Thus,	 this	
book	 is	 not	 a	 primer,	 a	 beginner’s	 compan-
ion	or	an	 introduction	to	 the	early	history	of	
modern	science,	 it	 is	 instead	geared	 towards	
experts	and	enthusiasts	who	are	already	well-











to	 the	 layman	 reader	 ‒	 quite	 the	 contrary.	
Gorham,	Hill	and	Slowik	offer	a	comprehen-
sive	introduction	that	covers	the	essential	in-
formation	 about	 the	mathematization	 thesis,	
explaining	both	its	central	concepts	as	well	as	
the	 historiographical	 function	 it	 served,	 ini-
tially	framing	it	as	the	transformation	of	sci-
entific	 concepts	 and	methods	 brought	 about	
by	 the	 application	 of	 mathematical	 ideas.	
Worthy	 of	 note	 is	 their	 inventory	 of	 three	
main	foci	of	contention	about	the	mathemati-
zation	thesis	during	the	seventeenth	century:	
the  issue  of  instrumentalism  versus  realism  
(due	to	growing	acceptance	that	mathematics	
is	 not	 just	 an	 approximative	 tool,	 but	 a	 true	
description	of	physical	nature),	the	manifold	






is	 elegant,	 useful,	 unifying	and	 simple,	 they	
nevertheless	point	out	its	limitations:
“Recent	 historical	 work	 and	 historiographical	
trends,	 however,	 have	 put	 considerable	 pressure	
on	 the	mathematization	 thesis,	 and	 in	many	 cases	










scientific	 revolution	 (...).	Add	 to	 this	 the	 growing	
trend	to	deny	that	this	emergence	is	revolutionary,	
as opposed to gradual or halting, and there seems to 
be	no	place	for	the	mathematization	thesis	in	current	
history	 of	 science.”	 (Geoffrey	Gorham,	 Benjamin	
Hill,	Edward	Slowik,	 “Introduction”,	 in:	Geoffrey	
Gorham et al. (eds.), The Language of Nature: Re-
assessing the Mathematization of Natural Philoso-
phy in the Seventeenth Century,	The	University	of	
Minnesota	Press,	Minneapolis	2016,	p.	15.)
It	 should	be	noted,	however,	 that	 for	 all	 the	
mentions	of	“reassessing”	and	“reevaluating”	
of established paradigms found in this book, 
most	essays	are	relatively	tame	with	regards	













challenges	 the	 widely-accepted	 version	 of	
the	 mathematization	 thesis	 that	 is	 found	 in	










ings for different thinkers. Cartesian philoso-
phers  (Rohault,  Le Grande,  Régis)  offered a  
suitable	 proving	 grounds	 for	 this	 thesis.	 In	
their	 teachings,	Ariew	 found	 a	multitude	 of	




“[T]hat	 natural	 philosophy	 can	 develop	 a	method	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 mathematics;	 that	 propositions	








to	 the	 method	 of	 mathematics	 or	 that	 philosophy	
is	 founded	 in	 mathematics.”	 (Roger	Ariew,	 “The	
Mathematization	 of	 Nature	 in	 Descartes	 and	 the	





from	 there	mostly	 argue	 about	 the	 scope	 of	
its	applicability.	A	number	of	them	attempt	to	
demonstrate	 the	 limited	scope	of	 the	project	
of	 mathematization,	 either	 by	 indicating	 ar-
eas	in	which	it	failed	outright	or	by	uncover-
ing	anachronistic	 elements	 in	 interpretations	
of	 successful	 instances	 of	 mathematization.	
Justin	Smith’s	text	“Leibniz’s	Harlequinade”	
sketches	 the	 limits	 of	 mathematization	 in	






perspectives	 that	 still	 remain	 faithful	 to	 the	
original	 idea.	 Dana	 Jalobeanu	 tries	 to	 show	
277SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA69	(1/2020)	p.p.	(263–279)
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that	 Francis	 Bacon’s	 purported	 dislike	 of	
the	 mathematical	 method	 is	 only	 a	 shallow	
reading	 of	 this	 philosopher,	 and	 Lesley	 B.	
Cormack	insists	that	practical,	applied	math-





goes  against  the  usual  grain  of  interpreting  
Leibniz	 as	 a	 philosopher	 who	 subordinated	






that	 can	 be	 found	 among	 the	 pages	 of	 this	
book,	 and	 those	 that	 we	 omitted	 from	 this	
review	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 any	 less	
relevant	than	those	mentioned.	They	engage	
with	 other	 interesting	 issues,	 ranging	 from	
mathematical	 methodology	 to	 mathemati-
cal	 realism,	offering	valuable	philosophical	
analysis	 and	 ample	 historiographical	 infor-
mation.	However	varied	the	immediate	top-
ics	 of	 these	 essays	 are,	 and	 irrespective	 of	
how	 sympathetic	 their	 authors	 are	 towards	
the	mathematization	 thesis,	 an	 overarching	
sentiment	 still	 emerges,	 a	 conclusion	 that	
answers	 the	 challenge	 that	was	 initially	 ar-
ticulated	by	 the	editors.	Much	like	 the	case	
of	the	idea	of	a	monolithic	scientific	method,	









says	 is	perhaps	not	 as	bold	or	daring	as	 its	
title	would	at	first	 suggest,	it	is	nevertheless	





Radical Skepticism and the
Groundlessness  of  Our Believing
Princeton	University	Press,
Princeton	2016
We	ordinarily	 take	 ourselves	 to	 know	many	




epistemology.	 Epistemologists	 have	 devel-
oped	 various	 proposals	 to	 tackle	 this	 threat.	
Duncan	 Pritchard,	 a	 leading	 epistemologist,	
makes	his	unique	contribution.	His	proposal	
is	significant	in	three	aspects.	
First,	 radical	 scepticism	 has	 two	 influential	
arguments,	i.e.,	the	closureRK-based	and	the	
underdeterminationRK-based	 sceptical	 argu-
ments.	 They	 are	 logically	 independent	 but	
equally	 devastating,	 and	 thereby	 a	 satisfac-
tory	 treatment	 of	 scepticism	 should	 be	 able	
to	counter	 them	at	 the	same	 time.	However,	
many	 anti-sceptical	 proposals	 fail	 to	 do	 so.	
Pritchard’s	project	is	unique	in	this	respect.
Second,	 the	 sceptical	 challenge	 can	 be	 eas-
ily	 evaded	 if	 one	 adopts	 externalist	 theories	
of	 knowledge.	 However,	 externalism	would	
concede	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 rationally	
grounded	knowledge	and	that	what	we	have	
is	merely	animal	knowledge.	 In	 a	word,	 the	
externalist	strategy	makes	a	big	concession	to	
the	 sceptic.	While	 internalists	aspire	 to	 save	
rationally	 grounded	 knowledge,	 it	 is	 easier	
said	than	done.	Pritchard’s	book	provides	an	








we	 need	 to	 diagnose	 the	 sceptical	 problem.	
A	 diagnostic	 anti-sceptical	 proposal	 may	
include	 the	 following	 inquiry.	 What	 is	 the	
source	of	scepticism?	Is	 the	source	 innocent	
or	problematic?	Where	do	we	go	wrong	when	
we	 take	 the	 sceptical	 paradox	 as	 plausible?	
Pritchard’s	diagnostic	story	helps	us	to	resist	
the	sceptical	lure.




of	 sceptical	 arguments,	 i.e.,	 the	 closureRK-	
